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RECENT DECISIONS
Torts: Bing v. Thunig: The End of Hospital Immunity in New
York-In preparing the plaintiff for an operation, a hospital-em-
ployed nurse spilled an inflammable antiseptic on his sheets. The
plaintiff was seriously burned when the liquid was ignited by a cau-
terizing iron being used by the plaintiff's doctor. The plaintiff sued
the doctor and the hospital. The trial court instructed the jury that
the hospital would be liable only if it was found that the act of the
nurse was an administrative act as opposed to a. medical act. The
jury found that it was an administrative act and the plaintiff
received judgment against both. On review, the Appellate Division
held that the nurse's act was medical, therefore, the hospital was
not liable. Finally, the Court of Appeals held against the hospital.3
They ruled that the hospital could be held liable for any negligent
act of an employee that was committed within the scope of his
employment. 2
The court specifically overruled the fifty-year old Schloendorff
case.3 The Schloendorff rule made a hospital's liability, for the acts
of its employees, dependent on the nature of the injury-producing
act. If the act were found to be medical, the hospital was immune
from liability. If the act were found to be administrative, then the
hospital became liable.
The Schloendorff case reasoned as follows: (1) The doctrine of
vicarious liability would not apply to situations involving a hospital
and a doctor, or a hospital and nurse, since they were independent
contractors when treating patients. This was due to the special skill
needed and the hospital's lack of control over them, in the exercise
of that skill. (2) That the imposition of liability might limit the serv-
ices offered by charitabel institutions by depleting their funds and
forcing them to restrict their activities. 4 The administrative-medical act
distinction arose when the court excluded certain acts of nurses from
the immunity rule. This was done on the theory that in the perform-
ance of administrative duties, the nurse remained a servant of the
hospital.5 The only apparent reason for this distinction, was an intent
to compromise between complete liability and complete immunity.
In the principal case, the court pointed out that the weakness of
the rule was evidenced both by the inconsistent decisions7 and by the
'Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 143 N.E. 2d 3 (1957).
2-This article concerns only the liability of the hospital. The doctor's liability
was not. brought up on this appeal.




6 Bobbe, Tort Liability of Hospitals in New York, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 419 (1952).
7 An improperly capped water bottle was held to be a negligent, administrative
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exceptions,s resulting from its application. Its fault was due to the
lack of a valid basis for the distinction. The holding that doctors and
nurses were independent because they exercised special skills, was not
based on sound logic. Other skilled people, such as mechanics and
pilots, have been held to be servants.9 Skill alone does not outweigh
the fact that the hospital may employ and discharge a doctor, nurse,
or intern; it pays their wages; it can assign and reassign them to
various duties; and often it trains them. It can truly be said that the
hospital does control them. The fear that a voluntary hospital will
suffer, unless the immunity rule is retained, is no longer in accord with
fact. They are given wide community support. They can secure
liability insurance. They operate in an efficient and business-like man-
ner. There is little danger that subjecting them to lawsuits will result
in ruin. This is illustrated by looking to the states that apply the
respondent superior doctrine to hospitals.10 The court further pointed
out that the rule had been applied in situations involving profit-making
hospitals," so that institutions which were paid for services were pro-
tected by an immunity rule originally designed to safeguard only
charitable hospitals.
The court declared:
"Hospitals should, in short, shoulder the responsibilities
borne by everyone else. There is no reason to continue their
exemption from the universal rule of respondeat superior. The
test should be, for these institutions, whether charitable or prof-
it-making, as it is for every other employer, was the person who
committed the negligent injury-producing act one of its em-
ployees and, if he was, was he acting within the scope of his
employment ."
2
The hospital's employees can be classed into doctors and other
employees. In the latter group are included nurses, interns, and tech-
nicians. Administrative personnel, such as janitors, need not be con-
act in Iacono v. New Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 296 N.Y. 502,
68 N.E.2d 450 (1946). But a hot water bottle that was allowed to remain for
too long a time on the patient, was said to be a medical act, Sutherland v.
New York Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 298 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E.2d
583 (1948).
s Courts no longer applied the rule to public hospitals, Liubowsky v. State of
New York, 285 N.Y. 701, 34 N.E.2d 385 (1941). Nor would the courts use
the rule where the act was committed by a non-professional employee (a
technician who required only six weeks training), Berg v. New York Society
for the Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455
(1956).
9 See note 1 supra.
10 See: President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942), Cohen v. General Hospital Society of Connecticut, 113
Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931) ; Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 7 Terry 350,
83 A. 2d 753 (1951).
11 Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, 302 N.Y. 870, 100 N.E.2d 51 (1951).
122 N.Y.2d at 667, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
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sidered here, since the Schloendorff rule did not exempt them from
the application of the respondeat superior doctrine.
In general, doctors are considered to be independent contractors, 13
even in the case of staff doctors. 14 However, where the injury-
producing act was committed by a resident doctor in the course of
routine medical care the hospital has been held liable.15
If the doctor is held to be an independent contractor, it becomes
crucial to determine the status of other employees because the hospital
can avoid liability if the negligent actor is solely the servant of an
independent contractor at the time of the act.',
The hospital's liability for the injury-producing acts of its nurses
and other employees, can be grouped into three general classes: (1)
The independent acts of such employees; (2) The acts of the nurse
and employee performed in the presence of the doctor;' (3) the acts
of such nurse or employee performed while rendering medical treat-
ment prescribed by a doctor, but not done in his presence.
The injury-producing act upon which the hospital's liability was
based in the Bing case was that of the nurse. The act was not per-
formed in the presence of the doctor nor was it specifically directed
by him. Such an act is clearly one done as a servant of the hospital
and not as an independent contractor.
The question arises in the principal case: If the doctor were
present, at the time the inflammable liquid was applied, would the
hospital be relieved of all liability for the nurse's act? The doctor's
control, in the operating room, has been held to make him the exclusive
master of all acts performed in his presence.' 7 A better view would
be to let the facts of each case govern. Thus, a nurse-anesthetist would
be the servant of the hospital, although the negligent act occurred
during an operation, in the doctor's presence.""
The area of greatest difficulty arises where the nurse or other hos-
pital employee performs medical treatment prescribed by a physician
but not performed in his presence. 9 When the employee commits a
negligent, injury-producing act under these circumstances, he should
13Ybarra v. Spangaro, 25 Cal. App. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Hull v. Enid
General Hospital Foundation, 194 Okla. 446, 152 P.2d 693 (1944).
14 Mayers v. Litow,--Cal. App. 2d-, 316 P.2d 351 (1957). However, the court
stressed that an agency relationship was not shown by the facts. The doctors
were not being paid by the hospital; financial and other arrangements were
made between the patient and the hospital, and there was no other conduct
or words from which the plaintiff could infer an agency relationship.
15 Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W2d 639 (1952).
'6 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §227 (1933).
'2 Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956); St.
Paul-Mercurp Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212 Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d
637 (1942) ; Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pa. 752 (1923).
is Cavero v. Franklin General Benevolent Society, 36 Cal. App., 2d 301, 223 P.2d
471 (1950).
19 Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956).
1957-19581
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be considered a servant of the hospital. At the most, the hospital has
merely divided its control over the employee and not relinquished it
completely to the doctor. In such a case, there is an inference that
the original service continues and the employee remains in the hos-
pital's employment during the performance of any work entrusted
to him by the hospital.
20
The application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to hospitals,
places the liability of the hospital on the familar principles applied to
all other employers. It assures the injured person that he can look
to the proper party for compensation.
"Certainly, person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities'
expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its
nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.s 21
FRANCIS SEROOGY
Contracts: Impossibility of Performance Caused by Promisor's
Negligent Mistake- Plaintiff was third party beneficiary of a
contract entered into by her father, the deceased, with her mother,
which contract was embodied in a divorce decree. Under the agree-
ment, deceased promised to continue paying premiums upon an in-
surance policy in which plaintiff was named beneficiary. Unknown to
both contracting parties, the policy in question had lapsed some twelve
years prior to the divorce agreement. When plaintiff discovered this
fact, after her father's death, she filed a claim against his estate for
the face value of the policy. Defendant, the executrix of his estate,
contended that the nonexistence of the insurance policy at the time
the alleged contract was entered into prevented any contract from
having been formed. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and
defendant appealed. Held: Judgment affirmed. The nonexistence of
the essential subject matter to a contract does not void the contract
when the promisor, due to his own negligence, failed to discover the
facts which made performance by him impossible. In re Zelimer's
Estate, 1 Wis. 2d 46, 82 N. W. 2d 891 (1957).
The established rule concerning the effect of the nonexistence of
the subject matter of a contract may be briefly stated as follows:
"Where parties assume to contract and there is a mistake
with reference to any material part of the subject, there is no
contract because of the want of mutual assent necessary to
create one; and in this connection it has been said that mistake
does not so much affect the validity of a contract, as it does to
20 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §227, comment b (1933). But see the Swigerd case, sup-
ra note 19, where the court held that when an employee is acting pursuant to a
doctor's instructions, the hospital is liable only if the injury-producing act
is "administrative." Like the Schloendorff rule, this bases the whole question
of responsibility on the nature of the act alone, rather than on all of the facts
involved in the particular case.
21 2 N.Y.2d at 667, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 143 N.E.2d at 8.
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